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So, once again: just what is “enlightenment”? Clifford Siskin and William Warner 
propose that the twenty essays brought together in their confidently titled volume This Is 
Enlightenment offer a new answer to this familiar question. They suggest that “Enlightenment” 
(which they capitalize but typically do not precede with the definite article) was “an event in the 
history of mediation” (1). It was something that took place in newspapers and magazines (7), 
creating a world where writers discovered new ways of using printed materials, and where 
readers found themselves struggling to keep up with the flood of texts that swept over them. 
Sometime around 1800 it became the victim of its own success and was replaced by something 
called “Romanticism” (19, 164). In contrast, Dan Edelstein maintains that the Enlightenment is 
best understood not as “an aggregate of ideas, actions, and events,” but rather as the narrative 
that “provided a matrix in which ideas, actions, and events acquired new meaning” (13). First 
articulated at the close of the seventeenth century by members of the Académie des sciences, the 
Académie française, and the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, this narrative has played 
a leading role in “the story we tell ourselves about our values, our government, and our 
religions” (1). Indeed, for Edelstein, it has become “more than just a story: it was and remains a 
‘master narrative’ of modernity, even a myth” (116).  
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What is perhaps most striking about these two rather different answers to the question 
“What is enlightenment?” is that the differences between them are no longer surprising: we are 
used to seeing this seemingly simple question spawn a diversity of answers. Such disagreements 
are, after all, as old as “the Enlightenment” itself: one of the more famous attempts to explain 
what “enlightenment” was began with a 1783 dispute in the Berlinische Monatsschrift over the 
advisability of ending clerical participation in wedding ceremonies (i.e., a discussion of whether 
a particular practice might be characterized as “enlightened”), but it quickly turned into a debate 
over the criteria that might serve as the markers of “true enlightenment.” Though that discussion 
ended without agreement, it served as the provocation for the 1784 answer from Immanuel Kant 
that, as Edelstein (accurately) observes, now serves as a “one-stop shop for defining the 
Enlightenment” (117). 
Although the editors of This Is Enlightenment and the author of The Enlightenment: A 
Genealogy offer diverging accounts of the Enlightenment, they are united in their suspicion that 
Kant’s familiar definition of enlightenment as “mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity” 
is not particularly helpful. Edelstein sees it as both mistaken (since “the Enlightenment” was, in 
his view, less about ridding oneself of the “guidance of another” than with “exchanging one type 
of guidance for another” [117]) and unoriginal (since he sees Kant as simply repeating a story 
that had been told by French academicians a century earlier [109]). Siskin and Warner suggest 
that Kant’s answer—which functions, in their eyes, as a sort of “self-help manual”—points us in 
the wrong direction: “readers to the present day have seen Kant’s motto as a signpost to 
modernity, turning Enlightenment into a precursor to be blamed or celebrated” (2–3). Seeking to 
undo the mischief that Kant’s answer has wrought, both books look backward. Edelstein argues 
that the paradigm for subsequent accounts of what “the Enlightenment” involved was a narrative 
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that emerged in the wake of debates in French royal academies on the relative merits of the 
ancients and moderns. Siskin and Warner set the advent of “Enlightenment” at an even earlier 
date: it was the consequence of a transformation in forms of “mediation” first glimpsed by 
Francis Bacon (12–15). 
 *** 
Viewing the Enlightenment as “an event in the history of mediation” means that (in intent, if not 
always in execution) the contributions in This Is Enlightenment are less concerned with the 
stories seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers constructed to make sense of the changes 
taking place around them (i.e., the narrative whose history lies at the center of Edelstein’s 
account) than with the transformation that prompted the need for such stories in the first place. In 
their programmatic introduction, Siskin and Warner suggest that the term “mediation” should be 
understood as “shorthand for the work done by tools, by what we would now call ‘media’ of 
every kind—everything that intervenes, enables, supplements, or is simply in between” (5). As 
might be expected, print looms large in this history, “not only because there was more of it, but 
also because it insinuates itself into other forms of mediation” (10), and the most persuasive 
examples of what might be gained by focusing on the particular media that flourished during the 
eighteenth century are presented in the essays that examine the ways in which eighteenth-century 
writers, publishers, readers, and book pirates made use of the various printed materials that 
flooded the public sphere. Warner’s own essay in the volume looks at the transmission of a 
diverse range of printed documents (e.g., printed reports of proceedings, votes, and declarations 
at town meetings) by the Boston Committee of Correspondence in the run-up to the American 
Declaration of Independence. Drawing on the sociologist Ervin Goffman’s concept of “footing,” 
Michael Warner considers the relationship between the conceptions of preaching at work in 
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sermons destined for publication and those delivered by clergy concerned with their spoken 
impact. Anne Fastrup traces the differing guises in which Diderot presented himself (and, more 
generally, the image of the philosophe) to the reading public, noting his antipathy toward a print 
journalism that he saw as populated by “snarling reviewers eagerly waiting for every opportunity 
to strike at any weaknesses or flaws, ridicule the arguments of the encyclopedists, or mock them 
as private individuals” (270). In contrast, Adrian Johns’s discussion of the role of book piracy in 
the dissemination of Enlightenment texts argues that, in German-speaking Europe, “periodicals, 
not books” served as the “central vehicles” of an enlightenment that “classified the public into 
discrete segments based in particular topics: chemistry, medicine, philology, and so on” (309). 
Contributions from Paula McDowell and Maureen McLane document the ways in which ballad 
collectors considered the sort of scholarly apparatus required to “mediate” the passage into print 
of what came to be called products of an “oral culture.” Ann Blair and Peter Stallybrass discuss 
the various techniques of note-taking that late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century readers 
crafted to cope with the explosion of printed materials they confronted. And Helge Jordheim 
considers Michel Foucault’s discussion of Kant’s response to the question “What is 
enlightenment?” and what it tells us about the different temporalities at work in spoken 
utterances (e.g., Foucault’s lectures at the College de France) and printed texts (e.g., the 
subsequent circulation of materials culled from these lectures).  
Print, however, is not the only form of mediation scrutinized in this wide-ranging 
collection. John Guillory traces the history of the terms “medium” and “mediation” with a 
particular emphasis on attempts by Enlightenment thinkers to refine the symbolic systems 
employed in the transmission of ideas. In a similar vein, Knut Ove Eliassen and Yngve Sandhei 
Jacobsen examine the materials employed by eighteenth-century savants--for example, the 
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equipment that the naturalist Carl Linnaeus assembled before setting out on his expeditions--and 
the discourses they inspired. Mary Poovey sketches the particular contexts that enabled money to 
mediate value in the nascent global economy of the eighteenth century, and Ian Baucom draws 
out some of the implications of Poovey’s account by showing how money “as a carrier of law” 
has served as a means of expanding “the boundaries of law-sanctioned violence” (337) over the 
last several centuries.  
Other contributions operate with a broader notion of what counts as “mediation.” Robert 
Miles argues that the literary trope of the “inner stranger” (173) may be viewed as a “linguistic 
instance of mediation” that is every bit “as material a form of mediation as the financial 
instruments” examined by Poovey and Baucom since it “mediates between two reifications in the 
realm of subjectivity” (175). Siskin takes a similar tack in his own essay, which offers an account 
of “the genre of ‘system’” in Newton, Smith, Wordsworth, and Scott that sees “the history of 
system as something embodied—as something that mediates through its generic embodiments” 
(166). Kindred approaches to mediation are at work in John Bender’s exploration of the 
analogies between the novel and eighteenth-century scientific writing and in Bernhard Siegert’s 
account of the image of the “police” in Schiller and Mercier.  
Some of the contributors have more to say about mediation than they do about the 
Enlightenment. Like Poovey and Baucom, Arvind Rajagopal is concerned with the role of 
money: his essay offers an extended discussion of a 2004 television advertisement for the Times 
of India that traced the journey of a counterfeit 100-rupee note. But the relationship of this 
particular discussion of mediation to the volume’s analysis of “Enlightenment” hinges on little 
more than a brief invocation of Kant’s discussion of “guardianship” and a nod to Michel 
Foucault. The same can be said of Lisa Gitelman’s analysis of the evolution of Samuel F. B. 
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Morse’s telegraphic code: the only link to the broader concerns of the volume is a passing 
suggestion that Morse “relied upon Enlightenment aesthetic theory” (127). On the other hand, 
Peter de Bolla’s discussion of the emergence of the concept of “division of labor” in the work of 
Adam Smith is obviously concerned with an important Enlightenment figure, but de Bolla’s 
understanding of “mediation” is somewhat more elusive than those of his fellow contributors 
(the point seems to be that in order for a concept to change other concepts have to change along 
with it). Finally, the closing essay by Michael McKeon introduces yet another twist in the 
discussion of mediation by observing that while the “common usage” of the notion invokes the 
idea of “connection, conciliation, or communication,” mediate also means “to ‘intervene’ or to 
‘divide in the middle’,” which leads McKeon to speculate that perhaps “mediation” is “one of 
those ‘primal words’ whose ‘antithetical sense’ Sigmund Freud . . . finds not only in ancient 
languages but also in the archaic language of the dream-work” (385). By this time, a reader of 
This Is Enlightenment (especially if the reader happens to be a reviewer charged with figuring 
out how all of this is supposed to fit together—a task that probably counts as another instance of 
“mediation”) may begin to wonder whether answers to the question “What is mediation?” are 
any less diverse than responses to the question “What is enlightenment?”  
At that point, the reader/reviewer/mediator may be inclined to turn to Siskin and 
Warner’s programmatic introduction (another instance of mediation) for guidance.  It notes that 
“every kind of history foregrounds certain things and obscures others” (6), which suggests that  
the essays gathered in This Is Enlightenment might be read as an attempt to shift the focus away 
from the concern with “representation” that the editor/mediators view as the unhappy legacy of 
Kant’s response to the question “What is enlightenment?”(7) and to foreground the introduction 
and dissemination of the myriad instances of mediation examined in their collection. In contrast 
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to histories that attempt to trace emergence and disappearance of “ideas,” a “history of 
mediation” of the sort offered here is said to deal with a subject matter that is “more easily 
pinned down to specific times and places” (11). For Siskin and Warner, the crucial 
transformation that inaugurates the historical period known as “the Enlightenment” (at this point, 
the definite article becomes obligatory) takes place in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, a period marked by “new, or newly important” (12) changes in “infrastructure” (e.g., 
postal systems and coffeehouses), by the appearance of new “genres and formats” (12) (e.g., 
public newspapers such as the London Gazette, the Spectator, and Cato’s Letters), “associational 
practices” (18) (e.g., political parties, secret societies, and scientific academies), and by the 
establishment of new “protocols” (e.g., the “postal principle,” which stipulates that “any one can 
address any one,” the system of public credit, and the “regime of copyright” [14]). These 
transformations are said to establish “the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment” (12), 
and over the course of the eighteenth century these “cardinal mediations” went on to enable still 
other forms of mediation: for instance, magazines composed of previously published articles or 
reference works such as Chambers’s Cyclopedia. This proliferation of mediations provides 
evidence that the “very medium of mediation—its architecture of forms and tools, people and 
practices”—has become “load-bearing”: an individual action is now seen “as working not only 
on its own terms but also as a part of a cumulative, collaborative, and ongoing enterprise” (16). 
By the end of the eighteenth century these “proliferating mediations” reach a point of 
“saturation” as more and more people have access to them and even those without access find 
themselves shaped by their ubiquitous presence (19). In this account, the “Enlightenment 
project” resembles the Starbucks business model: no human being can ever be more than three 
blocks away from a mediation. The ubiquity of these mediations indicates that the Enlightenment 
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was “successful in its own terms” and should be viewed as “an event that ended itself” (20), 
rather than as a process that was “cut short or somehow interrupted by revolution or 
Romanticism” (19).  
 That accounts of the Enlightenment have tended to offer a rather different narrative—in 
which the Enlightenment appears as either an “unfinished project” in need of rescue or as a 
continuing catastrophe that must somehow be escaped—is attributed by Siskin and Warner to the 
continuing influence of Kant’s response to the question “What is enlightenment?” At the very 
moment when the Enlightenment was drawing to a close (since the mediations it had spawned 
had reached a point of saturation—like new Starbucks beginning to appear in the entryways of 
long-established Starbucks—and were beginning to “work in a different way” [172]), Kant came 
up with a definition of enlightenment in which human beings appeared as “a new kind of tool—a 
tool whose power now lay in its insistence on using its ‘own’ understanding to change itself” 
(20). But, as Siskin and Warner see it, Kant’s account was “philosophical, not historical”: it blurs 
the distinction between (in Julie C. Hayes’s formulation) “a historically locatable phenomenon 
and a particular intellectual stance” (171).  
 Hayes held that the ambiguity between these two senses of “enlightenment” (a 
distinction that those inclined to take advantage of the fact that not all English nouns need to be 
capitalized might frame as the difference between the historical period known as “the 
Enlightenment” and the set of practices, projects, or attitudes, not necessarily confined to this 
particular period, that go by the name “enlightenment”) was “in many respects a productive one” 
(Julie C. Hayes, “Fictions of Enlightenment: Sontag, Süskind, Norfolk, Kurzweil,” in 
Questioning History: The Postmodern Turn to the Eighteenth Century, ed. Greg Clingham 
[Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1998], 22). In contrast, Siskin and Warner would appear 
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to be suggesting that one of the benefits of situating the Enlightenment within a “history of 
mediation” is that it puts an end to such confusions and, as a result, breaks the seemingly 
irresistible hold that Kant’s account has exercised over discussions of the Enlightenment. The 
lessons of the history sketched in the introduction to This Is Enlightenment (which, of course, 
may not be shared by all the contributors to the volume) are: first, the Enlightenment was a 
success; and second, because it was a success, it’s over: in this history, the Enlightenment (as the 
euphemism goes) is history. 
But can an approach that foregrounds mediations and obscures ideas come to terms with 
the Enlightenment as “a historically locatable phenomenon”? As Dan Edelstein observes near the 
start of his “genealogy” of the Enlightenment, the media examined in This Is Enlightenment 
were by no means the exclusive possession of the figures we tend to view as representatives of 
the Enlightenment. As a result, an account that privileges processes of mediation over the content 
they mediate may have difficulties in specifying what belongs to the “historically locatable 
phenomenon” known as “the Enlightenment” and what doesn’t. “To locate the singularity of the 
Enlightenment,” Edelstein argues, “we must also consider what was mediated, not just how it 
was” (11).  
Edelstein’s point is well taken. As Darrin McMahon (Enemies of the Enlightenment: The 
French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) has shown, the Catholic enemies of the Enlightenment were as skilled in their use of the 
literary marketplace as the philosophes. Likewise, the network of artists and printers who infused 
political caricature (a medium unfortunately neglected in This Is Enlightenment) with a wit and 
savagery that have rarely been equaled launched salvos at both Edmund Burke and Richard Price 
— see, for example, Frederick George Byron’s depiction of Burke as Don Quixote, seated on an 
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ass that has the face of Pius VI, riding out of the door of his publisher to lay siege to the National 
Assembly and James Gillray’s famous image of Price, the “atheistical-revolutionist,” surprised in 
his midnight calculations (Nicholas K. Robinson, Edmund Burke: A Life in Caricature [New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1996], 142, 144). And Steve Pincus notes that coffeehouses were 
frequented not only by “republicans, radicals, and Whigs” but also by royalists, supporters of the 
Anglican establishment, and other critics of political and religious radicalism. One of the 
pamphlets he quotes observes that “a coffee-house, like logic, the lawyer, and the Switzer will 
maintain any cause.” (Pincus, “‘Coffee Politicians Does Create’: Coffeehouses and Restoration 
Political Culture,” Journal of Modern History 67, no. 4 [1995]: 807–34 [quote: 816–17].) The 
same might be said of mediations. 
If, as Edelstein argues, the mediations examined in This Is Enlightenment are, taken by 
themselves, incapable of delivering an account of the Enlightenment as a “historically locatable 
phenomenon,” then an attempt to view “Enlightenment” as “an event in the history of mediation” 
will wind up either employing “Enlightenment” simply as synonym for “the long eighteenth 
century” or falling back on an understanding of the period that is derived (explicitly or tacitly) 
from more conventional approaches. Either way, the alleged advantage of concentrating on 
mediations—namely, that they “can be more easily pinned down to specific times and places 
than ‘ideas’” and, hence, tracked “more accurately” (This Is Enlightenment, 11)—begins to fade. 
For even if we assume that it is easier to determine when a particular “mediation” appeared on 
the scene (e.g., the first British coffeehouse) than it is to pin down the first occurrence of an 
“idea” (e.g., the first use of “enlightenment” to designate the project in which the philosophes 
were involved), we would still have to work “ideas” back into the account in order to specify 
how the various mediations we are tracking advanced the set of practices, projects, and (for lack 
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of a better term) “ideas” that defined the Enlightenment as a “historically locatable 
phenomenon.” Siskin and Warner concede as much in a note assuring the reader “that ‘ideas’ 
have not been left by the wayside” and that their point is simply to highlight the difficulties of 
“constructing a history of ideas unmediated by genre, technology, etc.” (415). It is hard to argue 
with this more modest formulation; however, it is also easy to see how Edelstein could make a 
similar move and state that, of course, he is not proposing that “mediations” be “left by the 
wayside” but is only pointing to the difficulties of constructing a history of the Enlightenment 
that is unmediated by a consideration of “ideas” or, as he would probably prefer, “narratives.”  
The tendency to emphasize “mediations” at the expense of “ideas” may have something 
to do with Siskin and Warner’s desire to put some distance between their approach and an 
account that, at least on first glance, would seem to share much with theirs: Jürgen Habermas’s 
discussion of “bourgeois publicity” in his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied: 
Lutcherhand,1962). While acknowledging their debts to Habermas’s work, Siskin and Warner 
nevertheless stress that “understanding the Enlightenment as an event in the history of mediation 
differs in fundamental ways from the public sphere approach.” They maintain that Habermas’s 
account “invariably downplay[s] the mechanics of mediation, the role of technologies, the 
influence of genres, the dynamic of association, and the aggregate effect of elemental protocols.” 
Its separation of “the human from the tool and the group from its informing structures” turns the 
mediation of meaning into “something that rests with strictly human agency.” To make matters 
worse, this “human agency” appears in the guise of “the public,” a term the “abstractness” of 
which explains “both the allure and the liability” of Habermas’s account (23). Reprising Keith 
Michael Baker’s critique of Habermas’s use of the term “public sphere” to designate both the 
practices of communication that emerged over the course of the eighteenth century and a 
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normative model for “rational negotiation through communication” (Baker, “Defining the Public 
Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig J. Calhoun 
[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992], 183 ), Siskin and Warner wish to draw a clear demarcation 
between an examination of the work done by mediations and Habermas’s broader claims about 
the rise and subsequent fall of the “bourgeois public sphere” (23). By treating “mediations as 
themselves constituting a history” they seek to rescue “the enormous variety of Enlightenment 
mediations from being relegated to supporting roles in Habermas’s political master plot: the 
liberal-Marxist story of the bourgeois critique of and resistance to political absolutism” (23).  
Yet, once again, just what is it about a particular mediation (e.g., the network of 
coffeehouses that grew up in London at the close of the seventeenth century) that warrants 
calling it an “Enlightenment mediation”? If the phrase is to mean anything more than a 
mediation occurring at some point between 1680 and 1800, it is difficult to see how questions of 
agency, aims, and aspirations can be left in the background. Even if we assume that Habermas’s 
account of “the public sphere” has all the shortcomings that Siskin and Warner suggest (for some 
reasons to think that it doesn’t, see Harold Mah, “Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the 
Habermas of Historians,” Journal of Modern History 72 [2000]: 153-82), it still might be the 
case that his mingling of empirical communicative practices with the normative ideals they 
sought to advance is an inherent feature of any attempt to comprehend the event known as “the 
Enlightenment.”  If  the term “mediation” is to be understood as shorthand for “tool,” then a 
history of “Enlightenment mediations” cannot let the consideration of the various projects that 
these tools were being used to advance fade into the background. For these normative 
commitments and the “ideas” in which they were expressed were a central part of what the 
Enlightenment was. 
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 *** 
While the contributors to This Is Enlightenment approach the Enlightenment as “an 
event” and examine its rise, spread, and eventual “saturation” by tracking changes in media and 
mediations, the focus of Dan Edelstein’s study lies less with the social, cultural, or political 
transformations taking place in Europe across the long eighteenth century than with the story told 
about them. As he explains, the “prime objective” of this “genealogy” is “to reconstruct how the 
narrative of  'the Enlightenment' emerged as a self-reflexive understanding of the historical 
importance and specificity of eighteenth-century Europe” (2). Edelstein argues that the 
Enlightenment is best understood as a change in what Niklas Luhmann characterized as a 
“second-order observation”—i.e., it represented “not so much a change in the way people 
thought but a change in the way people thought about the way people thought” (13). As a result, 
the most salient characteristic of the period was that it “seems to have been the period when 
people thought they were living in an age of Enlightenment.” Indeed, what people were thinking 
matters less than their having “perceived themselves to be thinking or acting in ‘reasonable,’ 
‘philosophical,’ and ‘enlightened’ ways” (73–74). 
The narrative that Edelstein traces boils down to this: “the present age (siècle) was 
‘enlightened’ (éclairé) because the ‘philosophical spirit’ of the Scientific Revolution had spread 
to the educated classes, institutions of learning, and even parts of the government” (2). Edelstein 
finds this basic account already in place by the time of Jean-Baptiste Dubos’s Réflexions 
critiques sur la poésie et la peinture (1719), one of the first works to characterize the 
contemporary arts and sciences as distinguished by something called the “esprit philosophique” 
(24). This particular catch-phrase was not unique to Dubos (as Edelstein notes, “esprit 
philosophique” also turns up in contemporary works by Fontenelle and Fréret), but its usage in 
- 14 - 
Dubos’s Réflexions critiques is notable in that it appears there as part of “a whole constellation 
of keywords, which taken together come very close to designating what we would now identify 
as ‘the Enlightenment’” (24–25). Dubos did not regard the esprit philosophique as a recent 
development: he traced its origins to the 1650s or 1660s and credited its appearance to the works 
of Bacon and Descartes (27–28). But since Edelstein’s interest lies in establishing the genealogy 
of the narrative Dubos constructed, he is understandably less concerned with Dubos’s particular 
reasons for locating the origins of the esprit philosophique at this specific historical moment than 
with the sources that might have persuaded Dubos to speak of an “esprit philosophique” in the 
first place. For this reason it matters that the bulk of the discussion of the esprit philosophique 
occurs in a section of Dubos’s Réflexions critiques that addresses the contribution “the good 
authors of antiquity” made to the ability of moderns to “reason better than the ancients” (37).  
Dubos’s respect for the achievements of the ancients is the clue that points Edelstein in 
the direction of the particular discursive context in which the Enlightenment narrative first began 
to take shape: the “Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns” (36–37). While denying that this 
“domestic academic dispute” (36) was “to any degree the cause of the Enlightenment,” Edelstein 
suggests that we would not be misguided were we to think of it as “the catalyst that precipitated 
the Enlightenment narrative” (45). Its significance resides in the fact that it forced all those who 
entered it—and, as Edelstein stresses, this debate attracted a wide range of illustrious 
participants—to reflect on “how the present compared to the distant past” (45). Which side a 
thinker took in this debate turns out not to have been particularly important; indeed, Dubos 
defended the claims of the ancients. Simply by entering the debate, contestants were forced both 
to reflect on the contrasting achievements of ancients and moderns (and, hence, to engage in a 
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“second-order observation”) and to structure their arguments around a common conceptual 
opposition (namely, the contrast between “Ancients and Moderns”) (45). 
The idea that the “Enlightenment narrative” descended from what, in the end, was “a 
domestic academic dispute” (36) is central to Edelstein’s argument.  Tracing the genealogy of 
the narrative back to “a literary quarrel” counters the tendency to see the Enlightenment as “an 
intellectual crisis that ushered in ‘modernity’” (45):  pace Paul Hazard, it involved “a prise, not a 
crise de conscience” (13). Repeatedly stressing that its invention was “unrelated to any 
epistemological change” (28, see also 2, 23, 88, 115), Edelstein insists that there is no point in 
“searching for some intellectual revolution” or “epistemological seismic wave” that might have 
set this narrative in motion (28, 66). The most that can be said is that “it simply happened that it 
was in France that the ramifications of the Scientific Revolution were interpreted as having 
introduced a philosophical age, defined by a particular esprit, and as having a particular impact 
on society” (28).  Further, situating the debate that allegedly “precipitated” the “Enlightenment 
narrative” in a uniquely French dispute means that there is also little to be gained by searching 
for precursors to this narrative beyond the borders of France. Although English scientific 
achievements (i.e., Newton) figured in the narrative, Anglo-Dutch politics (e.g., the “Glorious 
Revolution”) did not (79–80). Edelstein assures the reader that this does not mean that Dutch or 
English writers had no importance “in the history of ideas” or “even in the history of 
Enlightenment ideas.” But it does mean that the genealogy of the narrative that would tie these 
ideas together into a coherent history “is primarily a French one” (21).  
The Enlightenment narrative may have been uniquely French in its origins, but it had 
cosmopolitan implications. For Edelstein, the account articulated by these French academicians 
between 1675 and 1730 was something more than one of a number of diverging answers to the 
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question “What is enlightenment?” that percolated throughout Europe over the course of the 
eighteenth century. It was, instead, nothing less than “the narrative of the Enlightenment” (2, 5, 
16)—indeed, this uniquely French account would eventually become “a ‘master narrative’ of 
modernity, even a myth” [116]).  
Though the subtitle of Edelstein’s book promises “a genealogy,” the book itself winds up 
offering two different genealogies. The first works its way backward from Dubos’s Réflexions 
and traces the lineage of the cluster of terms that Dubos brought together to the “Quarrel of the 
Ancients and Moderns.” The second moves forward from the Réflexions critiques and is 
intended to demonstrate that all subsequent accounts of the Enlightenment—whether by French 
philosophes or by their European colleagues—descend from the paradigm that had been 
constructed in the course of the Quarrel: they reiterate the narrative found in Dubos, but 
introduce no essential modifications in it. The implications of this second genealogy are a good 
deal more significant than the first: on it hangs the difference between regarding the Quarrel and 
its progeny as one among a number of contesting “narratives of enlightenment” and seeing it as 
“the narrative of the Enlightenment.” 
The evidence marshaled in support of this second genealogy is concerned, for the most 
part, with making the case that the philosophes added little to the general conception of 
enlightenment that was already in place by the time of Dubos’s Réflexions critiques. Edelstein 
maintains that, despite the invocation of  “a new siècle de lumière” and occasional swipes at vain 
displays of “erudition,” the philosophes made few significant advances beyond seventeenth-
century conventions of scholarship: works by the ancients far outrank those by the moderns in 
the citation indexes of the Encyclopédie (50); the organization of the work itself was “not that 
dissimilar to the early-modern commonplace book” (50–51); the philosophes’ understanding of 
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politics was profoundly shaped by early-modern humanists (55); their conception of natural law 
theory was deeply influenced by “classical representations” (58); their assumptions about God 
and nature were indebted to Jesuit teachings (65–66); and their overall aim was not to invent a 
new philosophical system but rather to assure that the intellectual achievements of the previous 
century were diffused throughout society (88). In their actions they remained, in most respects, 
denizens of the seventeenth century: the same royal academies that had been the location of the 
Quarrel served as their “de facto headquarters” (81); far from being critical of the institutions of 
the absolutist state, they viewed it as an ally in their struggles with their enemies (89–91); they 
were dependent on aristocratic patronage and skilled in the art of cultivating it (93–94); and 
those who were still alive in 1789 were not particularly enthusiastic about the Revolution (100–
103). There are times when The Enlightenment: A Genealogy reads like a more sensible version 
of The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.  While the philosophes may not 
have had more in common with Middle Ages than with the presents, they emerge from 
Edelstein’s account looking more like sixteenth-century humanists than nineteenth-century 
philosophical radicals. 
The narrative presented in Dubos also proved, in Edelstein’s view, to be a remarkably 
successful export. In a “rapid tour d’horizon” (104–115), he argues that “almost all of the 
European centers and figures of the Enlightenment were exposed to the writings of the 
philosophes” and that the narrative embedded in these works proved “sufficiently open-ended” to 
be “appropriated by almost anyone for almost any political or intellectual purpose” (105). While 
Hume and other Scots may have introduced variations in the French model by giving 
government a larger role to play in the spread of enlightenment than it enjoyed in Dubos or 
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Voltaire, this only serves to confirm the plasticity of the paradigm: “it offered a basic model that 
could be modified at will” (107).  
Ian Hunter’s account of the contest between “rival Enlightenments” at the University of 
Halle may, at first glance, seem to present more significant problems for Edelstein’s general 
thesis, since it confirms the existence, prior to the arrival of the French narrative, of alternative 
conceptions of enlightenment (Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical 
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006]). But 
these enlightenments amount to little more than a momentary speed-bump in a survey intended 
to show that there is but one Enlightenment narrative and that it comes from France. Since 
Hunter’s Germans were concerned only with “the world of learning,” rather than with the more 
general diffusion of enlightenment through society, their account was closer to the sort of 
narrative Thomas Sprat had employed in his 1667 history of the Royal Society (108, 29–30) than 
it was to the authentic “narrative of the Enlightenment” found in Dubos. Eventually, the 
Germans got with the program and embraced the récit français: during the 1780s a “more fully 
self-aware concept of Aufklärung” arrived on the scene and—thanks to the diffusion of French 
writings throughout German-speaking Europe—this narrative “was pitched in specifically social 
terms.” Edelstein maintains that this “remarkable time lag” makes Hunter’s case for a 
specifically German tradition of “civic” enlightenment “particularly unconvincing” (108–109). 
Whatever stories may have been told at Halle, they doesn’t count—at least as Edelstein scores 
these things—as stories about “the Enlightenment.”  
Russian, Tuscan, and Neapolitan enlighteners turn out to have been exposed to the 
French narrative as well and, in most cases, found ways of adopting it to their needs: no rival 
English, Dutch, or German narrative had an equivalent impact (110–12). Edelstein’s tour 
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d’horizon concludes with a few reflections on the failure of either the Dutch or the English—the 
“two candidates rivaling France for the honor (if it is one) of having formulated the first theory 
of the Enlightenment”—to “produce particularly visible or viable enlightenment movements” 
(112). This argument would seem to up the ante: not only were the Dutch and English incapable 
of producing an “Enlightenment narrative” that could serve as a viable competitor to the French 
product, they were unable even to get an enlightenment organized. Dutch intellectuals, Edelstein 
argues, had little or no interest in the political, religious, and philosophical ideas that were being 
propounded by Huguenot émigrés in the wake of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (112–13) 
— though it is unclear whether he might allow that the Huguenots themselves might have been 
engaged in an enlightenment —  and although the English may have had various ideas about 
“reform and social instruction,” they “never really coalesced . . . into a movement that could be 
said to constitute an Enlightenment” (113). Until the arrival of the Rational Dissenters at the 
close of the eighteenth century, “one would be hard-pressed to find any group of English citizens 
that conceived of itself or of its aims in enlightened terms,” which suggests that, were there such 
a thing as an “English Enlightenment,” it (like the German one) was “certainly a latecomer” 
(113–14). 
This rather hectic survey of the reception of the French narrative is not the most 
convincing part of Edelstein’s study. The concession that, perhaps, the Rational Dissenters might 
count as a group that “self-consciously identified themselves” (113) with something that 
resembled an Enlightenment appears to have been a concession slipped into the text to plug a 
rather obvious hole (182, n. 54 indicates that it was a late addition) and consigning them to the 
“late eighteenth century” (113) ignores the problem that the struggles against the Test and 
Corporation Acts in which they were engaged reach back to the end of the seventeenth century. 
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Tracing that genealogy might suggest the existence of a narrative of enlightenment that—
uninfluenced by the narrative put together by Dubos—linked progress in the sciences, 
improvements in politics, and advances in religious criticism. Such a narrative (or narratives, 
since there is no reason to assume it took only one form) may have been a part of the lingua 
franca of the community of English and Huguenot exiles who gathered in the Dutch Republic 
during the 1680s.  
While it makes sense to distinguish, as Edelstein suggests, between “Enlightenment ideas 
and practices in particular” and “political or religious debates more generally” (114), it is 
important to recognize that narratives that regarded improvements in religion and politics as 
evidence of the spread of enlightenment were being constructed in England, Holland, and 
Prussia. Indeed, Kant’s answer to the question “What is enlightenment?”—which, for Edelstein, 
marks the moment when German latecomers finally take up the French narrative— argues that 
“religious matters” are “the main point of enlightenment” [Kant, “An Answer to the Question:  
What is Enlightenment?” in What is Enlightenment?  Eighteenth-Century Answers and 
Twentieth-Century Questions, ed., James Schmidt (Berkeley and Los Angeles:  University of 
California Press, 1996) 62-3]. There is no reason to assume that the limited role such concerns 
may have played in the narrative of enlightenment whose genealogy can be traced back to the 
Quarrel makes these narratives any less “narratives of enlightenment” than the French version. 
Likewise, although a case might be made that the “conceptual framework” of the French 
narrative of enlightenment was, as Edelstein argues, “historical, not epistemological” (115), it is 
far from obvious why those narratives in which epistemological shifts do play a role (e.g., John 
Toland’s use of Lockean epistemology in Christianity Not Mysterious or, for that matter, the 
attempt in the Discours préliminaire to bring a systematic coherence to the Encyclopédie) are 
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ruled out as viable alternatives to the narrative whose genealogy Edelstein has traced in his 
opening chapters. In other words, why assume that there is only one Enlightenment narrative 
(and, for that matter, only one Enlightenment)? 
The genealogy Edelstein is tracing seems at times to be marked by an odd circularity. The 
“Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns” plays the role it does in The Enlightenment: A 
Genealogy because it marks the moment when “the terms, but also the narrative, used to identify 
and define what we now call ‘the Enlightenment’ were first put into circulation” (21). But who is 
this “we” who defines “the Enlightenment” in this particular way (and what might a genealogy 
of this “we” look like)? A “we” that conceives of the Enlightenment in terms that are roughly 
equivalent to those deployed in Dubos’s Réflexions may well be inclined to agree that this 
particular narrative descended from the “domestic academic dispute” that raged in the French 
academies and Parisian salons between 1680 and 1720 and would also agree that it was “less 
epistemological than narratological,” that it was not particularly radical in either its political or 
religious views, and that it owed more to the century that preceded than to the one that would 
follow. On the other hand, a “we” that found it difficult to conceive of a narrative about the 
Enlightenment in which concerns about religious toleration are not a central issue, in which 
claims about rights and liberties do not loom large in the discourse, in which the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes and the Glorious Revolution play no role and events in England and the 
Dutch Republic, while important, aren’t really relevant to “the Enlightenment” will probably 
come up with a genealogy that looks rather different from the one that moves from Dubos back 
to the Quarrel (for an example of how a genealogy of this sort might proceed, see Margaret C. 
Jacob, “The Nature of Early Eighteenth Century Religious Radicalism,” which appears in 
Republic of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts I:1 [May 1, 
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2009], the fine online journal that Edelstein edits: http://rofl.stanford.edu/node/42.)  It is also 
likely that this “we” would look askance at emphatic claims about “the Enlightenment” and 
would not be particularly troubled by the prospect that there were many different narratives 
about enlightenment available to eighteenth-century Europeans (this “we” sounds a bit like J. G. 
A. Pocock, “Historiography as a Form of Political Thought,” History of European Ideas 37  
[2011]: 1–6).  Such a “we” might be grateful to Dan Edelstein for ferreting out this peculiar 
French narrative about enlightenment, but would be perplexed as to why Edelstein invests so 
much energy into securing its status as “the narrative of the Enlightenment.” After all, there are 
reasons for constructing genealogies other than identifying the pretenders and disinheriting the 
bastards.  
*** 
Siskin and Warner argue that one of the benefits of their effort to trace mediations rather than to 
determine the lineage of ideas is that it “spares us more intellect-wasting custody battles over 
Enlightenment: ‘It’s French, of course.’ ‘No, it’s actually British.’” A history of mediation, as 
they understand it, offers the prospect of shedding light on “both the singularity of each local 
event and what those events have in common” (11). Applying such an approach to the material 
explored by Edelstein might yield some interesting results (indeed, Edelstein’s own involvement 
in “Mapping the Republic of Letters,” an attempt to map the network of correspondence across 
the period from 1500 to1800 [https://republicofletters.stanford.edu/], suggests that he is well 
aware of this point). For, while Edelstein may be right to argue that in order to understand the 
“singularity of the Enlightenment” we will need to “consider what was mediated, not just how it 
was” (11), it is also conceivable that sorting out the interchanges between the contesting 
enlightenment narratives that circulated throughout Europe over the long eighteenth century may 
- 23 - 
help us to understand what elements they shared as well as what set them apart. What Edelstein 
views as “a process of diffusion through which a singular concept of the Enlightenment was 
made available to different cultures, which in turn adapted it” (3) could, presumably, count as yet 
another example of what Siskin and Warner have in mind when they speak of “mediation.” But 
there is no reason to assume that this mediation always took the form of the appropriation of a 
French message into the language of a local culture and even less reason to suppose that this 
particular account was the only one to be mediated.  
Finally, the so-called “historically locatable” Enlightenment might itself benefit from a 
genealogy that would explore how a number of diverging historical accounts of “the 
Enlightenment” (each of them with a different “we” who saw the Enlightenment in a particular 
way) emerged from a series of eighteenth-century disputes about the activity known as 
“enlightenment.” Despite their differences, both This Is Enlightenment and The Enlightenment: 
A Genealogy tend to concern themselves with the historical period now known as “the 
Enlightenment” rather than with the diversity of practices that may have passed for 
“enlightenment” in eighteenth-century Europe. Siskin and Warner concede that “although the 
cluster of words, formulations, and practices that we have been noting did not precipitate the 
term ‘Enlightenment’ until later,” but nevertheless argue that their use of the term should not be 
viewed as an attempt to impose a retrospective coherence on the past (18).  For his part,  
Edelstein argues that “adopting a historicized standard to define the Enlightenment—as 
elastically as possible—will assist us in formulating criteria for determining what the limits of 
the Enlightenment might be” (17). But the “historically locatable” Enlightenment does not 
appear to have a univocal understanding of what enlightenment involved. Eighteenth-century 
Europeans used terms like “enlightenment” in ways that suggest that such terms were highly 
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contested.  These contests were joined by individuals who, while viewed today as having little to 
do with “the Enlightenment” (or, worse still, who are often grouped under the singularly 
unhelpful category of “Counter-Enlightenment”), nevertheless understood themselves as 
defending what they took to be “enlightenment” against various impostors.  
For an example of how such contests played out, we need look no further than the 
controversy that produced Kant’s answer to the question “What is enlightenment?”  Johann Erich 
Beister, a member of the Prussian bureaucracy, argued that removing clergy from wedding 
ceremonies advanced the cause of “enlightenment.”  Johann Friedrich Zöllner — a clergyman, 
educational reformer, and (like Beister) a member of a secret society of “Friends of 
Enlightenment” — had difficulties understanding how Beister’s proposals could possibly be seen 
as fostering “enlightenment,” at least as he understood the notion.  So he asked for a definition.  
While there may be good reasons to share the reservations expressed by both the editors of This 
Is Enlightenment and the author of The Enlightenment: A Genealogy about the particular answer 
Kant provided to the question that appeared in the pages of the Berlinische Monatsschrift, 
Zöllner’s question remains a useful one, if only because it reminds us that our sense of “the 
Enlightenment” does not always square with what the eighteenth century understood as 
“enlightenment.”  
